


NFAC

2 March 1978

NFAC MAG Meeting: 1 March 1978


Members Present:



1. The meeting with the DCI is tentatively scheduled for the week of 13 March. A preliminary meeting with a representative from Admiral Turner's Staff will probably take place sometime during the week of 6-10 March. Each NFAC MAG representative will be notified when arrangements are completed.

2. The 1 March MAG meeting concentrated exclusively on the editing of draft papers for the meeting with Admiral Turner. The first hour was spent finalizing [redacted] paper which recommended the institution of a formal policy for allocating a few GS-15 and GS-16 slots for analysts who do not desire managerial responsibility.

3. During the second hour the NFAC MAG discussed [redacted] draft on the "intelligence product." His paper favors wider access to intelligence materials including NODIS, EXDIS; the need for more information about policy decisions; increased feedback on specific topics policy makers are interested in and criticisms of the intelligence product.



CIA Operations Center
MAG Representative

Administrative - Internal Use Only

Problem:

NFAC offices lack sufficient slots at high grade levels to retain expert analysts as analysts rather than as managers.

Recommendations:

- Instruct PMCD that senior analyst positions are needed within NFAC
- Establish a formal senior analyst system generally at the GS-15 - 16 grade level

Pro

Retain outstanding analysts
Better intelligence product

Con

Could increase average grade or
reduce number of people at lower
grades

Could undermine current system of
having the Branch Chief as the
chief substantive analyst

Discussion:

At present, approximately 10% of the GS-15 slots are filled by analysts. Ostensibly, these positions exist to provide an alternative career path for those who excel as analysts and wish to continue working in that capacity in lieu of opting for a supervisory position.

In some offices, a senior analyst position is not viewed as a viable career objective. A frequent perception in most offices is that senior analyst slots are reserved for former supervisors. This would include individuals who might not have performed well as managers, those who might have lost out in a reorganization or those who simply did not like working in a supervisory capacity. Another perception is that senior analyst slots are used to attract experienced personnel from outside the Agency. Whether these perceptions are correct or not, the result usually is that by the time a good analyst reaches about GS-14, he or she starts looking for a supervisory position. Often a good analyst, who may or may not be a good manager, is lost.

For NFAC to do the best analysis possible, we must retain people who have developed a substantive expertise in needed areas as analysts. This means having a two track system, where one can stay an analyst and achieve the same grade as a Branch Chief/Division Chief (in most

offices GS-15-16) rank, vis-a-vis where one advances through the management route. Transferring from one career track to another might be proscribed, a priori, to prevent using such slots for placing poor managers -- "setting them out to pasture".

Senior analysts will have developed a substantive expertise in a given area, possibly including fluency in the language of a particular geographic area. They may also have lived in that geographic area. Such persons would serve as the backbone, or core, to the analytical field.

Problem:

NFAC analysts are being encouraged to devote more time to longer range analyses. The working environment in most NFAC offices is not conducive to such an effort. Many analysts, for example, must escape to the library to do their "deep thinking" in order to avoid the noise and constant distractions in their office. This, however, still does not protect them from the onslaught of current requests which almost always are given a higher priority.

Recommendations:

- When passing along external requests for papers or current intelligence support, recognize that they usually can be serviced only at the expense of long term research and analysis.
- If the current load on some NFAC offices cannot be reduced, increase the number of personnel assigned to handle it. (Given the already crowded working conditions, also allocate more space when adding people.)

Pro

A better analytical product
Analysts could focus on the most important issues
More timely longer-range analysis.

Con

Reduction of personnel elsewhere
Not all requests would be met

Discussion:

This problem is severe in NFAC production offices. For example, in ORPA, three-fourths of each analyst's day is spent responding to current requests originating mostly from State, the President, the NSC, the NIOs and you. Contrary to general perceptions, most of their time is not spent writing for current productions (NIDs, PDBs, and the Weekly take up only 23% of an analyst's time), but in responding to ad hoc requests for papers, briefings, and telephone queries. NFAC is a service organization and under most circumstances priority should be given to responding to specific consumer needs vice producing a self-initiated product. However, in passing along external requests, consideration should be given to whether NFAC is adequately, or the best suited, to respond to a given request and whether such requests should be serviced if it means less time can then be devoted to more analytical work.

Problem:

The Brzezinski letter urges NFAC analysts to produce more policy-related and forward-looking analyses. If we are to meet these objectives we will need better access to policy information and more interaction with those who are making policy. The lack of feedback from the top policymakers is a significant problem.

Recommendations:

- Maintain the pressure on the State Department to make policy-related cable traffic -- NODIS and EXDIS put in compartmented channels -- available to the NFAC analyst.
- Encourage the Intelligence Community to provide more detailed reporting on international negotiations and bilateral meetings to which the US is a party.
- Encourage direct analyst/requester contact once a request has been laid on.
- Seek feedback on our products, particularly when they are generated in response to specific requests.

Pro

better intelligence product
fewer errors in reporting
improved data base for analysis
more effective policy support

Con

could result in leaks

Discussion:

We recognize that the NODIS problem has improved dramatically in the past month. Nevertheless, we still do not receive some critical reporting. Not surprisingly, the gaps in the reporting usually start to occur just as the top policymakers are seized with the topic. Often the lack of reporting reflects time pressure or the increased use of the telephone. We are not asking to know what happened "yesterday" at "the talks." Our point is that we must be told at a later date what actually transpired at the meeting or during the course of the negotiations if we are to produce policy-relevant intelligence. This problem also applies in instances where some Departments have attaches in US embassies abroad and their reporting is direct to their home office.

Briefing books are prepared for events such as a visit of a foreign dignitary to the US or a high level US visit to another country. The US officials who meet with the foreign dignitaries are in a unique position to provide useful substantive biographic information based on their observations and personal impressions. It is rare, however, for analysts to receive such feedback. We feel that if analysts could debrief either the head of the US delegations or other knowledgeable members of their staff, we could acquire valuable information for future use.

Problem:

There is a critical time lag in treating after-hours medical emergencies, particularly heart attacks when minutes mean life, but not excluding the relief of trauma (shock) from fractures, burns, and lacerations. The CIA does not officially recognize qualified Agency personnel who are on duty after-hours and can administer to those needs while an ambulance is en route.

Recommendation:

Provide authorization, the necessary equipment, and use Agency personnel who are state-certified "paramedics" capable of providing critical first aid (CPR, oxygen) for heart attack victims, immobilizing fractures, and treating other injuries.

Pro

Make emergency medical assistance available more rapidly

The state certification and Virginia's Good Samaritan Law exonerate from legal action any person providing assistance

Con

OMS and Legal Counsel question competence and Agency liability under emergency circumstances

Discussion:

Agency personnel who are also Fire Department Rescue Team members are on hand to provide immediate aid during the 20-minute ambulance delay en route. When off-duty here, they are frequently on duty with the ambulance and respond to our calls. These rescue team members are state-certified in Virginia and Maryland as to their level of competence.

The number of Agency and FPS personnel on duty after hours at headquarters should not be a factor in considerations, nor should the number of heart attacks which have occurred within any specified period of time. No additional staffing or budgetary allotments are required, only authorization. P&PD is adequately staffed to meet the strict deadlines for delivery of Agency publications downtown; giving assistance would not interfere with work schedules. P&PD supervisors have expressed a willingness to authorize an absence to assist in an emergency.

(Virginia plans to but at present does not use the term "paramedic." It is used on the West Coast, particularly California, a carryover of the military application, Virginia has the ratings: Advanced First Aid Technician, Emergency Medical Technician, and Cardiac Care Technician.)

Additional Areas of Concern:

1. What direction do you see NFAC taking in the next 2-3 years?
2. How do you plan to divide responsibilities with Mr. Carlucci?

STAT

Approved For Release 2009/08/12 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000200650010-1

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO:

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

STAT

FROM:

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
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REPLACES FORM 36-8
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Approved For Release 2009/08/12 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000200650010-1

25X1

SECRET

Executive Registry

78-787

14 March 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM :
Deputy Executive Secretary

SUBJECT : Your 15 March Meeting with the NFAC
Management Advisory Group

25X1

Attached as background for your 15 March, 2:00 p.m. meeting with the NFAC Management Advisory Group is a summary of the progress made on the major recommendations they submitted to you during your first session with them on 8 June 1977. One member of the current group, , attended that meeting.

25X1

Attachments

25X1

Regraded Administrative-
Internal Use Only when
separated from Secret
Attachment(s).

SECRET

~~ADMINISTRATIVE~~—INTERNAL USE ONLY

Summary of Progress Made on NFAC MAG Recommendations Submitted on 8 June 1977

I. Communications

1. Expand "Notes from the Director" and increase its distribution.

--Done

2. Continue to use Management Advisory Groups as vehicles for two-way communication.

--You have continued to meet with MAGS as well as other representative groups of employees.

II. Substantive Guidelines

1. Communicate to analysts why briefing drafts are not used.

--In his role as Presidential Briefing Coordinator, [] now does this.

2. Establish a regular feedback system so analysts will know how their product was received and will be informed of additional requests.

[] now does this for Presidential Briefings.
--You also provide feedback both at staff meetings and by memo to D/NFAC (example attached).

3. Review briefing preparation process so that information is forwarded without excess formalization, time consumption, or coordination.

--Per [] current system designed to accomplish above:
--he converts material to the format required;
--required reviews are done simultaneously rather than sequentially to save time.

4. Reform briefing request process to reduce distortion of requests by intervening levels.

--Per [] intermediate levels can illuminate as well as distort requests.
--To discourage the latter, analysts are provided copies of your notes and questions and participate in pre-briefing sessions and DCI/NIO meetings.

5. Provide access to someone on your staff to clarify requests when necessary.

--[] fills this role for your Presidential Briefings.

III. Internal Coordination

1. Coordinate last minute changes in the PDB with representative from the appropriate office.

--This is now being done.

2. Fully coordinate all DDO contributions to current intelligence products.

--This is now being done in 90 percent of the cases.

--When items are tabled for the first time at the 5:30 review meeting, senior NFAC representatives present (Lehman, NIO, Office Director, etc.) do the coordinating.

--Analysts should inform them of any particular concerns.

3. Coordinate with all appropriate offices papers dealing with topics of concern to more than one office.

--NFAC is aware of this problem and progress is being made.

--More progress is apparent in coordinating between individual analysts than between individual offices.

IV. Interagency Cooperation

1. Solicit cooperation of other departments and agencies in providing analysts access to their data.

--Consistent efforts being made in this area recently resulted in an increased availability of State NODIS material.

2. Seek feedback on our products.

--You have been doing this and have communicated the same at staff meetings and by memos.

--The response to Dr. Brzezinski's letter on intelligence analysis will include a plea for more feedback from senior policymakers.

~~ADMINISTRATIVE—INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

SECRET

Executive Registry


78-8515

6 March 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Usefulness of Agency Product to Top Policy-makers

1. At the 2 March SCC meeting on the Horn of Africa, SecDef, SecState, and the National Security Council Advisor to the President all made specific reference to items that had been in the PDB within the previous several days. On top of that, the map chart boards which we supplied were the focus of a great deal of attention during the meeting and hence were very useful.

2. I'd simply like to let your analysts, the PDB Staff, and your graphics people recognize that their product is proving to be very useful to our top policy-makers and definitely is being employed. Good work.



STANSFIELD TURNER

E2 IMPDET
CL BY DCI

SECRET

Executive Registry

78-601

27 FEB 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Promotion System, Titles and Fitness Reports

1. I continue to get complaints about the two-step promotion system. Particularly at NPIC people see others working beside them being promoted two steps at a time. I understand that we did a study on this some time ago; it proved that because our promotions come more frequently, our people in fact make more money going up by single steps. I'd like to put something in a Director's Note and/or have you put something out to be sure people understand that our single-step promotion policy is in the interests of our employees--if that is the case.

2. A suggestion came to me the other day to put more emphasis on intelligence in the titles we give to our people. People like communicators are not distinguished as being in the intelligence world because we simply call them communicators. Should we call them intelligence-communicator, intelligence-personnel officer? This whole subject of titles is related to a memo I sent to DDO about whether they would change the names "para-professional" to "operations support personnel" and "clerical" to "support personnel." They are looking at it for DDO; I'd appreciate if you would look over this whole question of titles for the Agency as a whole.

3. I'd also like to know about how an employee becomes designated as a career employee. What type of a form is he given? Who fills it out and presents it to him, etc.?

4. I'd like to know if there is a standard procedure within the Agency for whether or not a supervisor has access to fitness reports written in an individual's record. In particular, I think there is a point to be made as to whether the supervisor is entitled to see previous fitness reports which he has written and previous fitness reports which others have written. I get the impression there is some inclination to be sloppy in fitness report writing by virtue of simply using past ones as models.

5. Do we have any statistics on whether different Directorates and divisions have markedly higher percentages of Outstanding, etc.? Have we ever thought about requiring the rating officer to indicate how many people he is grading in each category so as to have some check on whether he is excessively generous? How long since we've changed our fitness report form? Is it the same form for all Directorates?

STAT


STANSFIELD TURNER

10 MAR 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Performance Evaluation Workshop Course

What has the utilization of our Performance Evaluation Workshop Course been in the past year? Do you think we should do something to stimulate more utilization of it? I keep hearing disparaging remarks about the qualities of our fitness report writing.

STAT



-B- STANSFIELD TURNER

cc: DDA

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